کابل پرس

فرایند دموکراتیزاسیون افغانستان در دوره ی پسا طالبان

2010-12-20T21:39:04Z

نویسنده: فرهاد آرین/ برگرداننده از انگلیسی به فارسی: پویا رادمنش

پس از حملات یازدهم سپتمبر به امریکا، کنفرانس بن درهفته های پایانی سال 2001 بر آن شد تا نه تنها زمینه را برای صلح پایدار در افغانستان میسر سازد؛ بلکه پیش زمینه ها را برای استقرار دموکراسی در افغانستان پس از طالبان فراهم آورد. در پی این کنفرانس، موافقت نامه 5 دسامبر2001 میان جناح های سیاسی مختلف افغان به امضاء رسید که در آن حق تعیین سرنوشت سیاسی مردم افغانستان توسط خودشان و در مطابقت با اساسات دین مقدس اسلام، مبانی دموکراسی، کثرت گرایی و عدالت اجتماعی به رسمیت شناخته شد. با وجود آن که موافقت نامه بن سنگ پایه یی پنداشته می شد برای آغاز روند دموکراتیزاسیون افغانستان در دوره ی پس از 2001 اما حکومت افغانستان و هم چنان جامعه جهانی برای ایجاد بستر های لازم دموکراسی و نهادینه کردن نهاد های دموکراتیک در افغانستان، به دلیل چالش های موجود جنگ سالاری و گسترش دامنه ی شورش طالبان، کمترین جدیت را از خود بخرج دادند. در نتیجه ای این چرخش سیاست حکومت افغانستان و جامعه جهانی از نهادینه سازی دموکرا سی به اولویت های مهار جنگ سالاری و مبارزه با شورش طالبانی، نه دموکراسی در دوره ی پس از 2001 نهادینه شد و نه هم نهادهای پایدار دموکراتیک ایجاد و تقویت شدند.

در نخست باید یاد آور گردید که کنفرانس بن در نفس خود راه را برای نهادینه کردن دموکراسی در افغانستان هموار نکرد. با وجود آن که موافقت نامه بن حق تعیین سرنوشت سیاسی مردم افغانستان را به رسمیت شناخت؛ اما در عمل این بستر را هموار نکرد تا مردم افغانستان به گونه یی دموکراتیک در تعیین سرنوشت سیاسی کشور شان سهیم گردند. در عوض، اشتراک کنندگان کنفرانس بن گروه های مختلف سیاسی و نظامی افغان بودند که نه نمایندگی دموکراتیک مردم افغانستان را با خود حمل می کردند و نه هم از مشروعیت لازم در میان اقوام مختلف افغانستان از جمله پشتون ها، تاجیک ها، هزاره ها و اوزبک برخوردار بودند. یک چنین مکانیزمی غیر دموکراتیک زمینه ساز تحکیم پایه های قدرت و نفوذ این گروه های رقیب شد و بستر های لازم را برای جنگ سالاران میسر ساخت تا قدرت سیاسی را در افغانستان پس از طالبان قبضه کنند.

بنابراین، کنفرانس بن بگونه ی آگاهانه زمینه را برای گروه های سیاسی بی باور به دموکراسی و جنگ سالاران میسر ساخت تا با کشیدن نقاب نمایندگی از مردم افغانستان به صورت شان، دموکراسی را فدای خواسته و امیال شخصی و گروهی خود سازند. البته این نکته را از یاد نباید برد که برگزارکنندگان کنفرانس بن نیز حق تعیین سرنوشت سیاسی مردم افغانستان را به دست جنگ سالاران سپردند و در نتیجه به دموکراسی و حقوق دموکراتیک مردم این کشور برای تصمیم گیری در خصوص آینده ی سیاسی کشورشان پشت پا زدند.

افزون بر کنفرانس بن، در دوره ی تطبیق موافقت نامه بن در بین سال های 2001 و 2006 نیز تسلط بلامنازع جنگ سالاران بر نهاد های سیاسی و ملی افغانستان ادامه یافت.

فراموش نباید کرد که جامعه جهانی در جریان به اجراء گذاشتن موافقتنامه ی بن در سال های پس از 2001 یک سلسله تلاش های پیگیر را به منصه اجرا گذاشت تا قدرت و نفوذ جنگ سالاران را در نهاد ملی افغانستان مهار کند؛ اما همچو تلاش ها نتیجه ی مشخصی در پایان دادن به جنگ سالاری و تقویت روند دموکراتیزاسیون افغانستان به همراه نداشت. بدتر از آن این که جامعه جهانی مهار فزیکی جنگ سالاران را یگانه راه برای از میان برداشتن موانع نهادینه کردن ارزش های دموکراتیک در افغانستان دانست و در نتیجه در جهت ساختن زیربناء های لازم برای تقویت دموکراسی نوبنیاد افغانستان کمترین کوشش بخرج داده شد. نه تنها جامعه جهانی بلکه حکومت افغانستان نیز طی سال های اجرای موافقت نامه بن، از خود عملکرد مؤفقانه یی برای هموار سازی بستر های لازم دموکراسی به جای نگذاشت و نهاد های پایدار دموکراتیک را ایجاد نکرد.

در نتیجه ی تمرکز بیش از حد جامعه جهانی و حکومت افغانستان روی مبارزه با جنگ سالاری، دموکراسی نو بنیاد افغانستان هیچ گاهی فرصت آن را نیافت تا در بین سال های 2001 و 2006 تقویت شده و نهادینه گردد. به گونه مثال، هر چند انتخابات ریاست جمهوری و انتخابات پارلمانی سال های 2004 و 2005 گام های بزرگی به سوی نهادینه شدن دموکراسی در دوره ی پس ازطالبان به حساب می آیند، اما رهبری سیاسی افغانستان به مراتب ناتوان تر از آن بود تا از این دو انتخابات به عنوان اهرم فشار تقویت روند دموکراسی و مهار جنگ سالاری بیشترینه بهره را ببرد. در نتیجه انتخابات ریاست جمهوری و پارلمانی سال های 2004 و 2005 نه تنها حکومت منتخب رییس جمهور کرزی، بل پارلمان انتخابی و هم چنان قوه ی قضائیه افغانستان به سان گذشته، تحت تسلط گسترده جنگ سالاران به ویژه آنانی باقی ماند که با رییس جمهور کرزی روابط تنگاتنگ سیاسی داشتند.

توجه بیش از حد جامعه جهانی و حکومت افغانستان بالای مهار فزیکی جنگ سالاران از نهاد های حکومتی در روند تطبیق موافقتنامه ی بن، راه را نه تنها برای دموکراتیزاسیون سریع افغانستان هموار نکردند، بل نهادینه کردن دموکراسی را نیز در این کشور به مشکلات بیشتر از پیش روبرو ساختند.

نهایتاً در سال های پس از تکمیل و تطبیق روند بن (بعد از سال 2006)، افزایش موج تازه یی از شورش ها و خشونت های گسترده طالبان، سبب شد تا توجه جامعه جهانی و حکومت افغانستان از نهادینه سازی دموکراسی به جانب مهار شورش طالبانی تغییر جهت دهد. آنگاه که شورش طالبان و دیگر گروه های شورشی از سال 2003 به بعد روبه گسترش نهاد و در سال های پس از تکمیل روند بن به مراتب شدید تر هم شد، نه تنها جامعه جهانی بلکه حکومت افغانستان نیز دموکراسی را در مقایسه با اولویت های مبارزه با شورشیان کمتر اهمیت دادند و اولویت های پروسه ی دمکوکراتیک افغانستان را فدای اولویت های مهار شورش طالبان کردند.
بنابراین، نهادینه کردن نهاد های پایدار دموکراتیک در دوره ی پس از ختم روند بن نه تنها که از اولویت های سیاست جامعه جهانی ناپدید گردید، بل حکومت افغانستان نیز کاملا مسوولیت ملی اش را در راستای تقویت دموکراسی به باد فراموشی سپرد.

هم چنان قابل یاد آوری است که حتا در دوره پس از تکمیل روند بن نیز جامعه جهانی به گونه ی پراگنده کوشیده است تا حد اقل به صورت نمادین از دموکراسی نوپای افغانستان حمایت لفظی کند؛ اما حکومت افغانستان طی سالیان اخیر نه تنها که کمتر تمرکز روی نهادینه سازی دموکراسی نموده؛ بل به صورت پیگیر، آزادی های دموکراتیک شهروندان را به بهانه ی افزایش نگرانی های امنیتی ناشی از شورش طالبان و دیگر گروه های شورشی محدود ساخته است. به گونه مثال، انتخابات توأم با تقلب ریاست جمهوری 2009 و انتخابات پارلمانی 2010 دو نمونه برجسته یی از بی باوری و بی اعتنایی حکومت افغانستان به روند دموکراتیزاسیون کشور بوده است. در این دو انتخابات، شفافیت، اعتبار و فراگیری پروسه های انتخاباتی شدیدا به دلیل تقلبات گسترده و فساد سرتاسری زیر سوال قرار گرفتند و دموکراسی تازه بنیاد افغانستان از سنگ بناء به لرزه افتاد.
بی توجهی حکومت افغانستان به روند دموکراسی بیشتر از تغییر جهت سیاست جامعه جهانی از دموکراسی خواهی به مهار شورش طالبان سرچشمه می گیرد؛ چون رهبری سیاسی افغانستان طی سالیان اخیر اطمینان کامل یافته است که حرکت های دموکراسی ستیزانه اش کمتر مورد انتقاد جامعه جهانی قرار گرفته است. بنابراین، انتخابات های 2009 و 2010 به گونه ی آشکار نشان داده اند که جامعه جهانی مؤفق نگردیده است تا حکومت افغانستان را برای نهادینه سازی ارزش و نهاد های دموکراتیک زیر فشار قرار دهد و در نتیجه دموکراسی نو پای افغانستان تا هنوز به صورت رویایی باقی مانده است که به واقعیت پیوستنش کار نه چندان آسانی به نظر می رسد.

برای جمع بندی چنین نتیجه گیری می توان کرد که جامعه جهانی و حکومت افغانستان در نهادینه سازی دموکراسی پس از سرنگونی رژیم طالبان مؤفق نبوده اند. با وجود اندک دست آورد های دموکراتیک در نخستین سال های تطبیق موافقتنامه بن، نه فرایند دموکراتیزه کردن افغانستان مؤفقانه به پیش رفته است و نه هم زمینه ی توسعه نظام مند نهاد های دموکراتیک در دوره پس از 2001 میسر گشته است. دلیل نهفته در عقب ناکامی فرایند دموکراسی افغانستان در دوره ی پس از یازدهم سپتمبر نه تنها توجه بیش از حد جامعه جهانی به مهار فزیکی جنگ سالاران از نهاد های ملی و مبارزه با طالبان بوده است؛ بل نا توانی حکومت افغانستان در مدیریت مهار جنگ سالاری و شورش طالبانی نیز به مراتب و بیشر از پیش فرایند دموکراسی را در افغانستان امروزی به چالش کشیده و تضعیف کرده است.

برای تقویت بهتر دموکراسی، این بسیار حایز اهمیت است تا جامعه جهانی حکومت افغانستان را وادار به نهادینه سازی نظام مند دموکراسی و ایجاد نهاد های پایدار دموکراتیک سازد؛ در غیر آن، چالش های جنگ سالاری و شورش طالبانی همراه با بی باوری حکومت افغانستان به دموکراسی، بیشتر از پیش فرایند دموکراتیزه کردن افغانستان را تضعیف خواهد کرد که نتیجه آن جز شکست کامل دموکراسی در افغانستان سال های بعدی نخواهد بود.

پایان

رویکرد ها :

Afghanistan, (2010), The New York Times. Retrieved November 23, 2010 from www.topics.nytimes.com.

Suhrke, A. (2007), “Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan”, Working Papers, Chr. Michelsen Institute, pp.1-15.

Retrieved November 15, 2010 from www.journalsonline.tandf.co.uk.
The Future of Democracy in Afghanistan, (2009), The Government Monitor. Retrieved November 24, 2010 from www.thegovmonitor.com.

Post-9/11 Afghan Democracy: Far More Distant than Expected

Farhad Arian — 2010-12-18T13:48:57Z

This article aims to evaluate the post-9/11 efforts of the international community and the government of Afghanistan towards institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan. Not only the efforts of the international community and the Afghan government has been critically analyzed in this article, but also the positional factors such as counter-warlordism and counter-insurgency that have significantly undermined the post-2001 Afghan democratization process have been evaluated.

In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the UN-sponsored Bonn Conference of 2001 not only intended to build sustainable peace in Afghanistan but also opened the window for a formal democratization process in the post-Taliban era. The Bonn Conference resulted in the Bonn Agreement of 5 December 2001 that recognized the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely decide about their political future with reference to the principles of Islam, democracy, pluralism, and social justice. Regardless of the formal recognition of democracy by the Bonn Agreement, in the post-2001 period, both the Afghan government and the international community paid less attention in providing the ground for institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan due to the ongoing challenges of warlordism and the Taliban-led insurgency.

As a result of shifting the attention of the international community and the Afghan government from democracy to counter-warlordism and counter-insurgency, democracy has neither institutionalized nor systematically developed across permanent institutions in post-9/11 Afghanistan.

To begin, the Bonn Conference in its own did not provide the ground for the democratization of Afghanistan. While the Bonn Agreement of 2001 recognized the right of the people of Afghanistan to freely decide about their political future, it did not practically provide the Afghan people with the opportunity to democratically decide about the future of their country. Ironically, the participants in the Bonn Conference were the representatives of Afghan opposing groups that were neither democratically elected by the people of Afghanistan nor had legitimacy among various Afghan ethnic groups especially Pashtuns, Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks.

Such a non-democratic mechanism paved the way for the representatives of Afghan competing groups particularly warlords to entirely dominate the political power in post-9/11 Afghanistan. As a result, the internationally-sponsored Bonn Conference of 2001 deliberately provided each Afghan opposing group with a share of power in the political administration of post-Taliban Afghanistan; however, neither the international organizers of the Bonn Conference nor Afghan participating groups took democracy and the democratic right of the people of Afghanistan as an issue of central importance.
In addition to the Bonn Conference that non-democratically provided warlords with the exceptional opportunity to dominate political power in Afghanistan, during the implementation of the Bonn Agreement between the years 2001 and 2006 the dominance of warlords over permanent political institutions undisputedly continued.

Despite the fact that during the Bonn Process the international community consistently attempted to decrease the power of warlords over national institutions, such efforts did not necessarily contributed to the end of warlordism and the success of democratization process in Afghanistan. Paradoxically, the international community entirely focused on counter-warlordism as the main obstacle towards democratization process rather than investing in institution-building process for the development of Afghan democracy. Not only the international community but also the government of Afghanistan in the course of the implementation of the Bonn Agreement was partly unsuccessful in building permanent institutions for the intention of institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan.

As a result of over-concentration of both the international community and the Afghan government on counter-warlordism, Afghan democracy never found the opportunity to be institutionalized between the years 2001 and 2006.

For instance, although the Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2004 and 2005 were two significant steps towards institutionalizing democracy in post-Taliban Afghanistan, the internationally-backed government of Afghanistan was unable to counter the challenge of warlordism during and after the elections. Thus, not only the elected government of President Hamid Karzai but also the Parliament of 2005 as well as the Afghan Judiciary significantly remained under the dominance of warlords especially whom they had strong political ties with the government of President Karzai. As a result of the failure of the government of Afghanistan and the international community in effectively dealing with the challenge of warlordism during the Bonn Process, the efforts of the international community did not necessarily resulted in institutionalizing democracy in Afghanistan.

Finally, in the post-Bonn Process, the emergence of the Taliban-led insurgency has shifted the attention of the international community and the Afghan government from institutionalizing democracy to counter-insurgency. Once the Taliban and other insurgent groups became able to increase the insurgency after 2003, not only the international community but also the government of Afghanistan saw democracy as an issue of less important in comparison to the priorities of counter-insurgency. Institutionalizing democracy and building sustainable democratic institutions in the post-Bonn process, therefore, have not only disappeared from the policy priorities of the international community but also the Afghan government has entirely forgotten its national responsibility in strengthening democracy.

Regardless of the attempts of the international community in supporting the democratization process in the post-Bonn Process, the government of Afghanistan has paid no significant attention to the democratization process of the country. The Afghan government has not only less focused on institutionalizing democracy, but also continuously restricted democratic freedoms of citizens due to the increase of security concerned posed by the Taliban and other insurgent groups.

For example, the fraud-tarnished Presidential and Parliamentary elections of 2009 and 2010 have been two obvious examples of democratic deficit in the post-Bonn Process in Afghanistan. In these two elections, the transparency, credibility and inclusivity of the electoral processes were significantly undermined by the widespread fraud and corruption across the country. While in the post-Bonn Process the focus of the international community has shifted from the priority of the democratization of Afghanistan to counter-insurgency, the Afghan government has been over-confident in paying no attention to democracy. As a result, while the international community has failed to oblige the Afghan government in convening transparent and credible elections in 2009 and 2010 to further building democratic institutions, Afghan democracy is seemingly far longer from the expectations of the people of Afghanistan as well as the international community.

To conclude, both the international community and the government of Afghanistan have failed to institutionalize democracy in the post-2001 era. Despite few democratic achievements at the primary stages of the Bonn Process, the Afghan democratization process has neither been successful nor found the ground for systematically development in post-Taliban Afghanistan. The reason behind the failure of the democratization process in post-9/11 Afghanistan has not only been the over-concentration of the international community on counter-warlordism and counter-insurgency, but also the failure of the internationally-backed Afghan government in effectively dealing with such challenges has further undermined the democratization process. To better strengthen democracy, it is important for the international community to oblige the Afghan government in systematically institutionalizing democracy and building sustainable democratic institutions; otherwise, the challenges of warlordism and the Taliban-led insurgency would more undermine the democratization process to further result in the entire failure of Afghan democracy.

Farhad Arian is a former official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan. He is currently undertaking a Master of Arts in International Affairs at the Australian National University (ANU).

References
Afghanistan, (2010), The New York Times. Retrieved November 23, 2010 from www.topics.nytimes.com.

Afsah, E. & Guhr, A. H. (2005), “Afghanistan: Building a State to Keep the Peace”, Bogdandy, A. V. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, V. 9, pp. 373-456.

Enterline, A. J. & Greig, J. M. (2008), “Against All Odds? The History of Imposed Democracy and the Future of Iraq and Afghanistan”, University of North Texas, Department of Political Science, pp. 1-52. Retrieved November 10, 2010 from www.psci.unt.edu.

Jalali, A. A. (2006), “The Future of Afghanistan”, Parameters, pp. 4-19. Retrieved November 15, 2010 from www.carlisle.army.mil.
Johnson, T. (2006), “Afghanistan's post-Taliban Transition: The State of State-Building After War”, Central Asian Survey , Vol. 25, No. 1-2, pp. 1-26.

Hartzell, C. & Hoddie, M. (2003), “Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, No. 2, pp. 318-332.

Matisonn, J. (2010), “How the West Failed Afghan Democracy?”, Financial Times. Retrieved December 3, 2010 from www.ft.com.
Owen, A. (2009), “A Third Way: The Best Strategy in Afghanistan is neither Complete Withdrawal nor More Troops”, Progress Online. Retrieved December 1, 2010 from www.progressonline.org.uk.

Suhrke, A. (2007), “Democratization of a Dependent State: The Case of Afghanistan”, Working Papers, Chr. Michelsen Institute, pp.1-15. Retrieved November 15, 2010 from www.journalsonline.tandf.co.uk.
The Future of Democracy in Afghanistan, (2009), The Government Monitor. Retrieved November 24, 2010 from www.thegovmonitor.com.

Wollman, N. & Hairan, A. (2010), “Do We Want a Stable Democracy in Afghanistan or Just a Short Term Ally to Fight the Taliban?”, PSYSR Blog. Retrieved December 2, 2010 from www.psysr.wordpress.com.

2010 Afghan Parliamentary Election

Farhad Arian — 2010-12-08T12:24:35Z

More than 10 weeks after the 18 September Afghan Parliamentary Election, the Independent Election Commission of Afghanistan (IEC) announced the final results of the election on 24 October 2010. While the 2009 Presidential Election was significantly undermined by the widespread fraud and corruption, there were high expectations from the government of Afghanistan to ensure a transparent, credible and inclusive parliamentary election for 2010.

However, regardless of consistent efforts of the international community particularly the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), the 2010 Parliamentary Election took far longer than expected due to the widespread electoral fraud and corruption the same as the fraud-tarnished 2009 Presidential Election. Consequently the Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) invalidated about 1.3 million of the 5.6 million votes to further disqualified 24 winners after receiving more than 5,000 complaints of fraud across nationwide polls.

The final results of the 2010 Parliamentary Election particularly indicate that the government of Afghanistan has failed to have a majority of pro-government members in the new Parliament. In other words, President Hamid Karzai's favourite candidates have not done well in the vote; hence, pro-government parliamentarians will no longer be the majority in the House of Representatives of the new Parliament compared to the previous Parliament of 2005 in which the government's supporters formed the majority (NineMSN News, 2010).

According to the New York Times, President Karzai will be able to count on the support of at least 100 members of the new Parliament which is not enough to satisfy the Afghan government whereas Dr. Abdullah Abdullah the main opposition rival of the government has claimed that his supporters have won more than 90 seats out of 249 seats of the new Parliament. As a result, the new Parliament of Afghanistan will no longer be dominated either by President Karzai's favourite members or by the supporters of Dr. Abdullah. The new Parliament, however, will probably introduce some checks and balances on the Presidential power (GGS News, 2010).

Compared to the previous Parliament of 2005, the new Afghan Parliament will probably have a better opportunity to place some checks and balances on the power exercise of President Karzai. As long as the Afghan electoral system does not provide political parties with the opportunity to run for the election in their own capacity, Afghan political parties have not played a significant role in the electoral process because the majority of candidates for the 2010 Parliamentary Election have run as individuals rather than the representatives of political parties (Bijlert, 2010). There are, however, concerns that the lack of the representatives of political parties in the new Parliament not only undermines the ability of the Parliament to introduce some checks and balances, but also gives the floor to the Afghan government to seek possible ways in encouraging individual parliamentarians to support the government dominance over the Parliament.

Despite the dominance of the new Parliament by individuals, the government of Afghanistan will still be facing a strong parliamentary opposition consisting of the supporters of Dr. Abdullah the main opposition leader, and the representatives of Hazara and Uzbeck ethnic groups who have been widely disappointed from the government in the last couple of years (Media-Witty News, 2010).
While placing some checks and balances on the power of President Karzai by the new Afghan Parliament is the cornerstone for strengthening the post-2001 democratization process in Afghanistan, competition between various parliamentarians, in particular, ethnic groups might undermine the ability of the new Afghan Parliament to maintain a balance between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the state. For example, widespread ethnic tensions were the most obvious features of the previous Parliament of 2005, which not only led to further fragmentation among ethnics rather than national unity but also provided the government with the exceptional opportunity to broadly ignore the Parliament as an independent branch of the state (Sultanpoor, 2005).

However, the new Parliament is significantly varied from that of the previous one due to the ethnic representation of Afghanistan. For instance, there were 45 – 48% Pashtun members, 24 –27% Tajik members, 11 – 13% Hazara members, 8 – 9% Uzbeck members, and 4 –5% other ethnic groups members in the previous Parliament of 2005 (Sultanpoor, 2005). However, the Pashto-speaking majority in the new Parliament has now disappeared and Pashtun candidates have won only 88 seats out of 249 seats which accounts of 35% of the representatives in the new Afghan Parliament (GGS-News, 2010). Not only the Pashto-speaking majority has disappeared from the new parliament but also Tajiks have reportedly won nearly the same seats as Pashtuns (RFERL-News, 2010). Based on the significant changes in the ethnic representation, the new Parliament will no longer be dominated by a specific ethnic group, in which the major ethnic groups will have the opportunity to cooperate to further constraint one another that is mostly important for the practice of democracy in the Parliament of Afghanistan.

To conclude, the final results of the 2010 Parliamentary Election of Afghanistan indicate that the Afghan government, regardless of its consistent efforts, has failed to have a majority of its supporters in the new Parliament. Not only have President Karzai's favourite candidates had less opportunity to win the majority in the Parliamentary Election but also the ethnic representation of the new Parliament has been largely changed due to the significant disappearance of Pashtun members. However, the final results of the 2010 Parliamentary Election indicate that the new Parliament will probably place some checks and balances on the President Karzai's power in the forthcoming years. If ethnic tensions again do not undermine the performance of the new Parliament, the new component of the Parliament will significantly contribute to power-sharing among various ethnic groups to further strengthen the democratization process in Afghanistan.

References
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